IRAQ

WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT

Status

1. Strategic Framework

Latent
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Strategic Framework is assessed at the "**latent**" level. There is a lack of leadership at both the individual and institutional level, though awareness of workforce development (WfD) has been raised by the newly launched national education and higher education strategy and the draft TVET strategy. Employers and industry have a limited role in defining strategic WfD priorities, but they express an urgent interest in achieving this. While there are numerous stakeholder coordination committees, they do not have clear mandates, working protocols or authority.

2. System Oversight

Latent
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System Oversight is assessed at the "**latent**" level. Funding for training provision depends on the annual public budget and is not based on performance or needs assessments. A national qualifications framework has not been developed, nor are there competency standards, skills testing and certification, or systems of accreditation for TVET. Prior learning is not recognized in the TVET system, and there is poor articulation across the various training and educational programs. The draft TVET strategy intends to improve these connections and address the poor public perception of current programs.

3. Service Delivery

Latent
● ○ ○ ○

Service Delivery is assessed at the "**latent**" level. Public training providers have limited autonomy. Private training providers are few, due to bureaucracy, lack of demand, and a poor private sector. There are limited links between training institutions, employers, and research institutions; industry is not involved in curriculum design and specification of standards; and recruitment of managers and instructors does not take account of industry experience. An integrated data system for TVET does not exist, and training providers are not required to systematically report data to monitor, assess or improve institutional performance.

Systems Approach for Better Education Results

THE WORLD BANK

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Executive Summary

There is a widespread feeling of urgency in Iraq, across the public and private sectors, to improve workforce development (WfD) and the links between education and the work place.[1] However, the country has no clear strategy or plan of action for WfD. The existing WfD structures in Iraq do not have the authority or clear agendas to move forward. In addition, the necessary linkages across technical and vocational education and training (TVET) programs and other types of education or the work place are limited. As a result, Iraq was rated at a **Latent** stage for all three dimensions on the Systems Approach for Better Education Results (SABER) WfD assessment: Strategic Framework, System Oversight, and Service Delivery.

Iraq participated in the SABER WfD initiative, a new World Bank tool that provides systematic documentation and assessment of the policy and institutional factors that influence the performance of education and training systems, in order to gather information that can inform the country's dialogue on how to improve WfD policies and practices. While all efforts were made to consult key WfD stakeholders and prepare an accurate representation of the WfD system in Iraq, a lack of documentary evidence made this exercise challenging. This report documents, as best as possible, the policies and institutions that play a role in developing the country's workforce. The accuracy of information collected in this exercise has been validated through a formal meeting with key WfD stakeholders (held on May 23, 2013).

This report is aimed at key WfD stakeholders and provides a systematic analysis of the functioning of the WfD system in Iraq at the current time. It also examines the implications of the findings and presents suggestions for Iraq's next steps based on the experiences of many other countries with established and advanced WfD systems.

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[1] This report does not include the region covered by the devolved Kurdistan Regional Government.

1. Introduction

Iraq is located in the Middle East and North Africa region. Over the past three decades the country has experienced major political, economic and social turmoil. The Iraq-Iran war of 1980-1988, the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the economic sanctions of 1991-2003, the 2003 Iraq war and the continued instability that followed have severely affected the economic and human development of a country that in the 1970s was considered among the fastest developing in the world.

Iraq faces many challenges that hinder sustainable development, including the lack of an economic vision and strategy, public budgets that depend almost entirely on oil revenues, a poor private sector, high unemployment rates, and a shortage of skilled labor (particularly among youth). To inform policy dialogue on these important issues and document the status of the Workforce Development (WfD) system, the Vocational Education Department of the Ministry of Education (MOE) in central Iraq has joined the World Bank's Systems Approach for Better Education Results (SABER) initiative.[2] The analysis of central Iraq's WfD policies and institutions presented in this report will assist the Department and other stakeholders to identify policy gaps and determine steps required for the design of a national WfD strategy. This report covers central Iraq only and does not include the Kurdistan region.

This diagnostic analysis is based on a new World Bank tool known as SABER-WfD, part of the SABER initiative. The tool aims to provide systematic documentation and assessment of the policy and institutional factors that influence the performance of education and training systems. The SABER-WfD tool encompasses initial, continuing and targeted vocational education and training offered through multiple channels, and focuses largely on programs at the secondary and postsecondary levels.

Analytical Framework

The tool is based on an analytical framework that identifies three functional dimensions of WfD policies

institutions:[3]

(1) *Strategic Framework*, which refers to the practice of advocacy, partnership, and coordination in relation to the objective of aligning WfD in critical areas to priorities for national development;

(2) *System Oversight*, which refers to the arrangements governing funding, quality assurance and learning pathways that shape the incentives and information signals affecting the choices of individuals, employers, training providers and other stakeholders; and

(3) *Service Delivery*, which refers to the diversity, organization and management of training provision, both state and non-state, that deliver results on the ground by enabling individuals to acquire market- and job-relevant skills.

Figure 1: Functional Dimensions and Policy Goals in the SABER-WfD Framework

Source: Tan et al. 2013

Taken together, these three dimensions allow for a systematic analysis of the functioning of a WfD system as a whole. The focus in the SABER-WfD framework is on the institutional structures and practices of public policymaking and what they reveal about capacity in the system to conceptualize, design, coordinate and

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implement policies in order to achieve results on the ground.

Each dimension is composed of three Policy Goals that correspond to important functional aspects that WfD systems aspire to (figure 1). Policy Goals are further broken down into discrete Policy Actions and Topics that reveal more detail about the system.[4]

Information for the analysis is gathered using a structured SABER-WfD Data Collection Instrument (DCI). The instrument is designed to collect, to the extent possible, facts rather than opinions about WfD policies and institutions. For each Topic, the DCI poses a set of multiple choice questions which are answered based on documentary evidence and interviews with knowledgeable informants. The answers allow each Topic to be scored on a four-point scale against standardized rubrics based on available knowledge on

global good practice (figure 2).[5] Topic scores are averaged to produce Policy Goal scores, which are then aggregated into Dimension scores.[6] The results are finalized following validation by the relevant national counterparts, including the informants themselves.

Figure 2: SABER-WfD Scoring Rubrics

1	**2**	**3**	**4**
Latent	**Emerging**	**Established**	**Advanced**
Limited Engagment	Some instances of good practice	Systemic good practice	Systemic good practice meeting global standards

Source: Tan et al. 2013.

The rest of this report summarizes the key findings of the SABER-WfD assessment in central Iraq and also presents the detailed results for each of the three functional dimensions. To put the results into context, the following chapter presents a brief profile of the country's socioeconomic makeup.

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[4] See Annex 2 for an overview of the structure of the framework.

[5] The rubrics used to score the data are shown in Annex 3. As in other countries, the data are gathered by a national principal investigator and his or her team, based on the sources indicated in Annex 4; and they are scored by the World Bank's SABER-WfD team. See Annex 5 for the detailed scores and Annex 6 for a list of those involved in data gathering, scoring, validation and report writing.

[6] Since the composite scores are averages of the underlying scores, they are rarely whole numbers. For a given composite score, X, the conversion to the categorical rating shown on the cover is based on the following rule: $1.00 \leq X \leq 1.75$ converts to "Latent"; $1.75 < X \leq 2.50$, to "Emerging;" $2.50 < X \leq 3.25$, to "Established;" and $3.25 < X \leq 4.00$, to "Advanced."

2. Country Context

Iraq is a federal state located in western Asia and comprised of 18 provinces.[7] Once praised for its wealth and bright economic prospects, the continued political and economic instability since 1980 has inhibited the country's ability to reach its potential. Attacks to important oil infrastructure during the 2003 war cost the country a significant loss of revenue and severely affected its oil-dependent economy. Although the violence peaked in 2006-2007 and attacks to oil infrastructure appear to have ceased, political tension continues across the country. Despite the remaining political instability, an average Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth of 9 percent between 2013 and 2017 is anticipated, largely driven by the recovery of the oil sector and the expanding role of foreign oil companies.[8] GDP growth is expected to allow an increase in government spending, and to reduce the unemployment rate.

Demographics: Iraq has approximately 34 million people, and its population growth rate of 3 percent is one of the highest in the region and the world.[9] In 2008, approximately 38 percent of the population was under 15 years of age. The size of the working age population (15-64 year olds) has increased at a sustained pace from 48 percent in 1987 to 53 percent in 1997 and 58 percent in 2008.[10]

Unemployment: Given the lack of reliable data, official unemployment figures vary greatly. The most recent formal survey on unemployment was carried out by the Central Statistical Organization (CSO) in 2003 and determined an unemployment rate of 28 percent.[11] In subsequent years, the Ministry of Planning (MOP) developed estimates that often contradicted other official figures. In 2011, the Iraq Knowledge Network (IKN) Survey found an unemployment rate of 8 percent; however, in early 2012 the MOP stated that the unemployment rate was 33 percent, comprising 11

Figure 3: Rate of Unemployment in Iraq

Source: Iraq Knowledge Network 2011.

percent with no job and 22 percent with unstable employment.[12] Within months, the MOP adjusted its figure to 16 percent and the Parliament's Economy and Investment Committee announced an unemployment rate of 25 percent.

Rural areas have been hardest hit by unemployment, with more prominent rates in the provinces of Thi-Qar and Anbar, and lower rates in the provinces of Kirkuk, Erbil and Ninewa.[13] As shown in figure 3, unemployment rates for youth are alarmingly high. Diversity among youth from an educational and skill-level perspective is considered another challenge for the Iraqi economy. Twenty-four percent of participants in the labor force are uneducated, of which 41 percent can read and write and a further 43 percent have only a primary school certificate.[14] Furthermore, according to the IKN 2011 survey, unemployment is higher among highly educated youth. In response to this reality, the *National Development Plan for Iraq, 2010-2014* determined to adopt a set of policies to educate and increase the employability of youth.

Given the absence of reliable data sources, it is not possible to determine the number of men and women working in the public, private and informal sectors. According to the Minister of Planning, in May 2012 there were 3.5 million people working in the public sector on a permanent basis, a further 1 million working

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[7] The Kurdistan Region, which covers three of Iraq's 18 provinces (Erbil, Duhok and Sulaymaniah) is governed by the Kurdistan Regional Government and has not been included in this report.
[8] Economist Intelligence Unit 2013.
[9] Iraq, Central Statistical Organization 2012.
[10] Iraq, Ministry of Planning 2010.
[11] Iraq, Ministry of Planning 2010.

[12] Iraq Knowledge Network 2011.
[13] Iraq Knowledge Network 2011.
[14] Iraq, Ministry of Planning 2010.

on temporary contracts, and approximately 1.5 million working in security forces.[15] It is estimated, however, that between 30 and 40 percent of Iraqi workers are employed by the government.[16]

Economic Growth: GDP growth over the last few years has been a result of oil revenues, and therefore does not reflect real and sustainable growth. Accordingly, GDP growth in Iraq is subject to collapse as a result of any crisis or shock. With 23 percent of the population living below the poverty line, sustainable development in Iraq is far from the level required to improve quality of life.[17] Divisiveness and a lack of coordination and cooperation have characterized economic policy in Iraq in recent years. This has particularly been the case with respect to finance and monetary policies, which has exacerbated the severity of unemployment, inflation, and the spread of administrative corruption.

Iraq faces many economic challenges, being in transition from central control to more open markets. Main challenges include:

(1) The nature of the Iraqi economy, whereby the crude oil extraction and exportation sector accounts for 44 percent of the domestic product generated and 93 percent of total exports.[18]

(2) The increase in the imported portion, as compared to the domestic portion, of commodity supply in the Iraqi market.

(3) The private sector's limited role in the development process, as evidenced by the decline of its participatory share in economic activity, job creation, coverage of increased domestic demand, and investment generation. This has rendered the sector inflexible and unable to respond quickly to the changes targeted in the *National Development Plan for Iraq, 2010-2014* unless a suitable and attractive work environment is created.

Education: Despite the importance afforded to this sector by the Iraqi Constitution, development plans, and economic policies, there are indications of a lack of responsiveness. Data show a significant deficit in schools, low school enrollment rates (7 percent for kindergarten, 91 percent for primary, 36 percent for lower secondary, and 18 percent for upper secondary in 2009), and low levels of literacy (one in five Iraqis aged 10-49 cannot read and write).[19]

The situation is similar for higher education, which has tended toward vertical expansion in universities (increasing the number of universities and colleges), at the expense of quality of programs offered. There is a clear mismatch between the skills that students acquire and those that the labor market needs. Higher education institutions have centered their attention on humanities specialties, not on scientific and technical programs. Apart from graduates of medical and health schools, colleges and universities, there are no guarantees of job placement for secondary or higher education graduates in the public sector.

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[15] Iraqi Economists Network.
http://iraqieconomists.net/ar/2012/06/12/
[16] While the Economist Intelligence Unit (2013) estimates that 33 percent of workers are government employees, the IKN survey suggests the share is closer to 40 percent.
[17] Iraq, Central Statistical Organization 2012.
[18]Iraq, Ministry of Planning 2010.

[19] Government of Iraq, 2012 and Iraq, Ministry of Planning 2010.

3. Key Findings and Policy Implications

This chapter highlights findings from the assessment of Iraq's WfD system based on the SABER-WfD analytical framework and tool. The focus is on policies, institutions and practices in three important functional dimensions of policymaking and implementation—strategic framework, system oversight and service delivery.

Because these aspects collectively create the operational environment in which individuals, firms and training providers, both state and non-state, make decisions with regard to training, they exert an important influence on observed outcomes in skills development. Strong systems of WfD have institutionalized processes and practices for reaching agreement on priorities, for collaboration and coordination, and for generating routine feedback that sustain continuous innovation and improvement. By contrast, weak systems are characterized by fragmentation, duplication of effort and limited learning from experience.

The SABER-WfD assessment results summarized below provide a baseline for understanding the current status of the WfD system in central Iraq, as well as a basis for discussing ideas on how best to strengthen it in the coming years.

Overview of the SABER-WfD Scores

The overall results for central Iraq on the three Functional Dimensions in the SABER-WfD framework are shown in figure 4.[20] Iraq is rated at the Latent level for Strategic Framework, System Oversight, and Service Delivery. The findings suggest that WfD has not yet become a priority of the Iraqi government. In the absence of identified economic prospects and their implications for skills, there is no clear strategy or plan of action for WfD. The lack of an executive commission to coordinate actions of WfD stakeholders, effective and efficient funding mechanisms, and quality control of training provision also explain the current level of development of Iraq's WfD system.

While there are various coordination committees among the main education and training government providers, including the MOE, Ministry of Labor (MOL), Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research

(MOHESR), Ministry of Planning (MOP) and the private sector, there are no clear agendas, working protocols, legal commitments, or consistency of work. These committees do not possess any authority over their executive members, nor do they have the power to implement their recommendations, thereby lacking any kind of sustainability.

Public funding of education and training institutions is entirely dependent on the annual public budget with no assessment made of the impact of such funding. Iraq lacks a national qualifications framework (NQF), and accreditation systems. Prior learning is not recognized and there are limited linkages and articulation between different levels of technical and vocational education and training (TVET) programs.

Employers, industry and non-state education providers have little, if any, involvement in education and training. The government has not set targets or incentives for skills development and public institutions have limited autonomy to undertake WfD activities. A universal information system for state and non-state training providers has not been developed and monitoring of programs and system performance is weak.

Figure 4: Iraq Dimension-Level Scores

Note: Figure 2 provides an explanation of the scale on the horizontal axis.
Source: Based on an analysis of the data collected using the SABER-WfD questionnaire.

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[20] The full results are shown in annex 5.

Policy Implications

In the past few years, the Iraqi Government has shown greater interest in WfD and TVET. Four important policy initiatives were designed, but still need to be implemented, activated or strengthened:

(1) In 2010, a TVET High Committee was established in the Advisors Commission within the Ministerial Council. Most WfD stakeholders, including the MOE, MOHESR, MOL, MOP, Iraqi Businessmen Union (IBU) and Iraqi Federation of Industries (IFI), are represented in the TVET High Committee. Unfortunately, this committee has no legal status or working protocols, and does not possess any decision-making power with regard to WfD or TVET. In order to be effective, it is advisable that this committee is empowered to the level of an independent commission with clear mandates and responsibilities regarding system oversight.

(2) The *National Strategy for Education and Higher Education in Iraq, 2011-2020* was launched in 2012. However, this strategy, along with the *National Development Plan for Iraq, 2010-2014* and the *draft National Development Plan 2013-2017,* does not indicate a shift in training and education policies to foster a demand-driven approach to skills development. It would be advisable for the *draft National Development Plan, 2013-2017* to be revised and amended in order to identify and address the economic prospects of Iraq. At the same time, the *National Strategy for Education and Higher Education in Iraq, 2011-2020* should be adapted to include policies and plans of action towards the identification of skills required for the country's economic development, and ways to address these needs.

(3) Since early 2012, significant efforts have been made to develop a TVET strategy with input from a range of public and private sector stakeholders. A draft TVET strategy document has been prepared, which represents an important contribution to WfD, and is expected to be finalized and adopted in 2014.[21] The draft strategy could be strengthened, with the focus shifted from policy conceptualization to implementation. Specific enhancements and additions to the draft TVET strategy could include the following:

(a) Legally establishing a WfD commission in Iraq.
(b) Setting the direction towards autonomy of public education and training institutions and impact-based funding.
(c) Engaging employers and industry in education and training provision.
(d) Improving public perception of TVET.
(e) Establishing a NQF and accreditation systems.
(f) Establishing universal education and training information systems for state and non-state training and education institutions.

(4) In 2009, the parliament issued the Federal Service Council Law. The main purpose is to establish an independent organization responsible for career development and job placement in the public sector. Unfortunately, this organization has not yet been formed.

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[21] Iraq, TVET Supreme Coordinating Committee 2013.

4. Aligning Workforce Development to Key Economic and Social Priorities

WfD is not an end in itself but an input toward broader objectives—of boosting employability and productivity; of relieving skills constraints on business growth and development; and of advancing overall economic growth and social wellbeing. This chapter briefly introduces Iraq's socioeconomic aspirations, priorities and reforms before presenting the detailed SABER-WfD findings on Strategic Framework and their policy implications.

Key Socioeconomic Aspirations, Priorities and Reforms

Iraq's economy is very much dependent on oil revenues. More than 90 percent of the annual public budget comes from the production and exportation of oil. In July 2010, Iraq launched its first five year national plan since 2003, covering the period between 2010 and 2014. The plan's vision for Iraq is to be "an effective nation that functions in accordance with market mechanisms and a regional economic power that complements and is part of the international economy".[22] The plan intends to enable Iraq to "use its economic resources, both human and natural, effectively and efficiently to attain a competitive and diversified economy in which the private sector has a leadership role in generating wealth and jobs".

The main strategic objectives of the 2010-2014 National Plan include:

(1) Increase the GDP at a rate of 9.37 percent per year during the 4 years covered by the Plan.

(2) Diversify the economy through a gradual increase in the participation of sectors other than oil in the GDP—particularly the agriculture, industry, and tourism sectors—and through growing participation of the private sector.

(3) Increase the employment rate, particularly among youth and women, by activating the private sector's role in employment.

The 2010-2014 National Plan includes several policy principles for WfD:

(1) Advanced training and qualification programs can contribute to empowering the Iraqi labor force and increasing its skill level in a manner consistent with, and complementary to, Iraqi job market needs, thereby increasing the rate of participation in economic activity.

(2) Affirmation of women's economic role by adopting a strategy to improve their economic and social conditions would empower them and expand their opportunities and participation.

(3) Iraqi youth need to be empowered and their effective participation encouraged in areas that support the paths of sustainable development.

(4) To ensure the efficacy of employment policy, there must be a balance between labor supply and demand. The development plan should evaluate the country's needs from the available labor force and ensure the accuracy of its quantitative and qualitative sectoral trends.

With these principles as a framework, the National Employment Policy (2011) expressed the government's intention to develop a national TVET strategy and to create a National Council to coordinate its implementation. The Council would be also responsible for leading further "national policies for the development of skills and competencies according to actual and future needs of the labor market".[23] The Policy emphasizes the need to: (a) formulate a national framework for qualifications through a process informed by continuous communication with employers, workers and TVET institutions; and (b) improve the relevance of TVET by incorporating educational and technological advances into training programs.

In 2012, the Government of Iraq approved the *National Strategy for Education and Higher Education (2012-2022)*, an initiative developed with assistance from

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[22] Iraq, Ministry of Planning, 24.

[23] Iraq, TVET Supreme Coordinating Committee 2013, 13.

UNESCO, UNICEF and the World Bank. While not entirely focused on TVET, the strategy sets enrollment targets for vocational and technical education, and envisions capital investments to renovate more than 100 vocational schools and build more than 250 facilities for vocational schools, technical colleges, institutes and universities. [24] Furthermore, with guidance from the European Union and the British Council, Iraq is developing a TVET National Strategy that aims to "provide a realistic picture of training, technical and vocational education in Iraq … and explore opportunities available for this sector". [25]

SABER-WfD Ratings on the Strategic Framework

In the SABER-WfD framework, the role of WfD in realizing a country's socioeconomic aspirations materializes through actions to advance the following three Policy Goals: (a) setting a strategic direction for WfD; (b) fostering a demand-led approach to WfD; and (c) ensuring coordination among key WfD leaders and stakeholders. The ratings for central Iraq on these Policy Goals are presented and explained below, followed by a reflection on their implications for policy dialogue.

Based on data collected in the SABER-WfD questionnaire, central Iraq received an overall rating of 1.1 (**Latent**) on the Strategic Framework dimension (figure 5). This score is the average of the ratings for the underlying Policy Goals relating to: (a) Setting a Direction for WfD (1.0); (b) Fostering a Demand-led Approach to WfD (1.0); and (c) Strengthening Critical Coordination for WfD (1.3).

Policy Goal 1: Articulating a Strategic Direction for WfD

Leaders play an important role in crystallizing a strategic vision for WfD appropriate to the country's unique circumstances and opportunities. Their advocacy and commitment attract partnership with stakeholders for the common good, builds public support for key

Figure 5: SABER-WfD Ratings for Central Iraq on the Strategic Framework Dimension

Note: Figure 2 provides an explanation of the scale on the horizontal axis.
Source: Based on analysis of the data collected using the SABER-WfD questionnaire.

priorities in WfD, and ensures that critical issues receive due attention in policy dialogue. Taking these ideas into account, Policy Goal 1 assesses the extent to which apex-level leaders in government and in the private sector provide sustained advocacy for WfD priorities through institutionalized processes.

Iraq is rated at the **Latent** level on this Policy Goal, reflecting the lack of leadership at both the individual and institutional level. Visible champions for WfD, from the government or business community, are either absent or take no specific action to advance strategic WfD priorities. A champion could be a government or non-government leader who has a vision for WfD and exercises sustained advocacy around it. Coordination among champions should rely on routine, institutionalized processes and take place under well-integrated interventions to advance a strategic, economy-wide WfD policy agenda.

Despite the lack of visible champions in central Iraq, the development of the *National Strategy for Education and Higher Education (2011-2020)* and the *draft TVET National Strategy* denote the interest of various stakeholders in addressing the country's WfD challenges.

Policy Goal 2: Fostering a Demand-led Approach

Effective advocacy for WfD requires credible assessments of the demand for skills, engagement of employers in shaping the country's WfD agenda, and incentives for employers to support skills development. Policy Goal 2 incorporates these ideas and benchmarks

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[24] According to the strategy, in the next decade the net enrollment rate in vocational education should increase from 2 percent to 10 percent, and in higher education (including technical education) from 14 percent to 20 percent (Government of Iraq 2012).
[25] Iraq, TVET Supreme Coordinating Committee 2013, 8.

the system according to the extent to which policies and institutional arrangements are in place to: (a) establish clarity on the demand for skills and areas of critical constraint; and (b) engage employers in setting WfD priorities and in enhancing skills-upgrading for workers.

Iraq is rated at the **Latent** level for Policy Goal 2. There is no formal assessment of the country's economic prospects and their implications for skills; thus critical skills constraints have not been identified. While the *National Development Plan for Iraq, 2010-2014* has been launched, it does not include a clear strategy or plan of action for WfD, nor does it provide any incentives for the development and upgrading of skills. The only information available on skills needs is the MOP's efforts to identify the number of employees required by government agencies, but this did not include information on specific skills or job profiles.

Despite the existence of several coordination committees on TVET and WfD that include employer and industry members, firms believe that their role in defining strategic WfD priorities is limited. In addition, the absence of any market studies to address the mismatch between supply and demand for skills makes it difficult to develop strategic plans. During the SABER-WfD data collection meetings with various stakeholders, a wide sense of urgency was expressed to conduct these types of studies and to shift the mandate of education and training institutions towards a focus on market needs.

Policy Goal 3: Strengthening Critical Coordination for Implementation

Ensuring that the efforts of multiple stakeholders involved in WfD are aligned with the country's key socioeconomic priorities is an important goal of strategic coordination. Such coordination typically requires leadership at a sufficiently high level to overcome barriers to cross-sector or cross-ministerial cooperation. Policy Goal 3 examines the extent to which policies and institutional arrangements are in place to formalize roles and responsibilities for coordinated action on strategic priorities.

Iraq is rated at the **Latent** level for Policy Goal 3. Unlike non-government stakeholders, government ministries

and agencies responsible for WfD have clear mandates and legally defined roles. Law Number 8 of 2006 for the MOL, Law Number 22 of 2011 for the MOE, and Law Number 40 of 1988 for the MOHESR define the roles of these ministries in TVET.

Numerous coordination committees exist that include representatives of various stakeholders. Firstly, within each of the ministries responsible for TVET (MOE, MOHESR and MOL), there is a coordination committee in which the other two ministries are represented, along with other governmental and non-governmental agencies such as the MOP, the Ministry of Finance (MOF), and the private sector. These committees are intended to strengthen cooperation and coordination among stakeholders to support the policies and action plans of the designated ministry. However, these committees have no clear mandates or working protocols, and have limited or no authority. Therefore, their strategic coordination efforts face implementation issues and rarely lead to meaningful progress.

Secondly, based on the recommendations of a workshop organized by the Advisors Commission in the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers on integration of TVET institutions in Iraq, held in January 2010, a decree was issued to establish the High Commission on TVET. Its mandate is to adapt "suitable procedures to coordinate between the three main organizations responsible for TVET and systematize their relation with the private sector to direct the educational and training curriculum and programs towards current and future market needs and develop the proper means to identify market needs with the CSO within MOP".[26] Regrettably, no market studies have been conducted since then, nor does this committee possess the power to implement the recommendations of the Commission.

Nevertheless, during the SABER-WfD data collection discussions with government and non-government stakeholders, there is a widespread call to establish a TVET authority to oversee implementation and coordination of TVET strategies and plans. Such an effort is supported by the European Commission which is assisting in the development of the TVET strategy.

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[26] Cabinet Decree No. 28 of 2010.

Implications of the Findings

Currently, Iraq has little in the way of champions, vision and coordination for WfD. However, it appears that WfD and TVET stakeholders in Iraq are now more conscious of this deficit and of the importance of aligning WfD with key economic and social priorities. In particular, stakeholders are highlighting the need for strengthening the existing High Coordination Committee to the level of an independent commission with a clear mandate to advocate for WfD strategies and plans of action.

Iraq's level of development on the Strategic Framework dimension could benefit from various actions typically carried out in more advanced WfD systems. These include:

(1) Identifying the country's economic priorities, and providing clear incentive programs for skills upgrading in the public and private sectors.

(2) Conducting labor market surveys and identifying the implications of their findings in relation to skills.

(3) Developing a national plan for WfD in Iraq.

(4) Developing a national standard classification of occupations.

(5) Establishing a national labor market observatory.

(6) Incentivizing the involvement of the private sector in the provision of TVET.

5. Governing the System for WfD

An important function of WfD authorities is to foster efficient and equitable funding of investments in WfD, to facilitate effective skills acquisition by individuals, and to enable public and private employers to meet their demand for skilled workers in a timely manner. The objective is to minimize systemic impediments to skills acquisition and mismatches in skills supply and demand. This chapter begins with a brief description of how the WfD system is organized and governed before presenting the detailed SABER-WfD findings on System Oversight and their policy implications for Iraq.

Overall Institutional Landscape

There is wide agreement among stakeholders in Iraq of the importance of WfD as a means of improving the country's socioeconomic prospects. Yet, central Iraq does not have a designated agency responsible for setting a WfD strategy, articulating the role of various stakeholders, or overseeing WfD market needs.

MOE and MOHESR are the two main training providers in Iraq, and there is a very limited contribution from non-state institutions. The MOE focuses on vocational education at the secondary level through its General Directorate of Vocational Education (GDVE), and the MOHESR is responsible for postsecondary TVET which is managed by the Foundation of Technical Education (FTE). The MOL is a third major provider of TVET through its Department of Vocational Training. Other government ministries and agencies provide limited continuous training for their four million employees based on supply rather than demand. All government ministries and agencies are solely funded by the annual public budget without specific funding allocation procedures and with poor monitoring and evaluation.

SABER-WfD Ratings on Oversight of the WfD System

The SABER-WfD framework identifies three pertinent Policy Goals corresponding to oversight mechanisms for influencing the choices of individuals, training providers and employers: (a) ensuring efficiency and equity in funding; (b) assuring relevant and reliable standards; and (c) diversifying pathways for skills acquisition.

Figure 6: SABER-WfD Ratings for Central Iraq on the System Oversight Dimension

Note: Figure 2 provides an explanation of the scale on the horizontal axis.
Source: Based on analysis of the data collected using the SABER-WfD questionnaire.

Based on data collected by the SABER-WfD questionnaire, central Iraq receives an overall rating of 1.3 (**Latent**) for system oversight (figure 6). This score is the average of the ratings for the underlying Policy Goals: ensuring efficiency and equity of funding (1.3); assuring relevant and reliable standards (1.3); and diversifying pathways for skills acquisition (1.3).

Policy Goal 4: Ensuring Efficiency and Equity in Funding

WfD requires a significant investment of resources by the government, households and employers. To ensure that these resources are effectively used, it is important to examine the extent to which policies and institutional arrangements are in place to: (a) ensure stable funding for effective programs in initial, continuing and targeted TVET; (b) monitor and assess equity in funding; and (c) foster partnerships with employers for funding WfD.

Iraq is rated at the **Latent** level on Policy Goal 4. Despite continuous increases in public funding of the ministries responsible for initial and continuous education and training (MOL, MOE and MOHESR), this low rating reflects the lack of set funding allocation procedures. Enrollment, graduate employment and earnings are not used to assess the impact of financial resources allocation. Funding and recurrent funding for initial and continuous education and training conducted by different ministries and agencies depends on the annual public budget rather than performance. Funding allocation is subjected to availability and approval of authorities within the MOF, Ministerial Council, and Parliament.

With few exceptions, the private sector has limited or no role in the funding of TVET programs. Partnerships between training providers and employers are not common. However, the MOL and Shell Oil Company recently signed an agreement to upgrade the skills of local staff working in the oil fields. The MOL agreed to provide training facilities and experts while Shell Oil Company will contribute with its expertise, equipment and funding. The cooperation between the MOL and Shell Oil Company is a good example of a public-private partnership which could serve as a model for further collaborations.

Policy Goal 5: Assuring Relevant and Reliable Standards

WfD systems comprise a wide range of training providers offering courses at various levels in diverse fields. An effective system of standards and accreditation enables students to document what they have learned and employers to identify workers with the relevant skills. For Policy Goal 5 it is therefore important to assess the status of policies and institutions to: (a) set reliable competency standards; (b) assure the credibility of skills testing and certification; and (c) develop and enforce accreditation standards for maintaining the quality of training provision.

Iraq scores at a **Latent** level for this Policy Goal. The score is consistent with the country's lack of a NQF, competency standards, skills testing and certification, and systems for accreditation. Nevertheless, in 2011 the MOL in cooperation with the International Labour Organization (ILO) produced 33 new training programs based on competency standards and skills testing with a further 22 under preparation. Unfortunately, these training programs have not yet been implemented due to a lack of funding, with the exception of a small pilot project in Alnajaf province where there is a great demand for well trained staff in the hospitality sector.

In this case, implementation was possible through an agreement between the local government, the private hospitality sector, and the MOL by which the latter committed to provide training programs and associated funding.

Policy Goal 6: Diversifying Pathways for Skills Acquisition

In dynamic economic environments workers need to acquire new skills and competencies as well as keep their skills up-to-date throughout their working lives. Workers are best served by a system of initial and continuing education and training that promotes lifelong learning by offering clear and flexible pathways to transfer across courses, progress to higher levels of training, and access programs in other fields. For those already in the workforce, schemes for recognition of prior learning are essential to allow individuals to efficiently upgrade their skills and learn new ones. Policy Goal 6 therefore evaluates the extent to which policies and institutions are in place to: (a) enable progression through multiple learning pathways, including for students in TVET streams; (b) facilitate the recognition of prior learning; and (c) provide targeted support services, particularly among the disadvantaged.

Iraq scores at the **Latent** level for Policy Goal 6. This score demonstrates the lack of recognition of workers' prior learning in the main education and training stream, as well as poor articulation of the various training and education programs. Iraq's education system does not recognize workers' knowledge acquired through alternative and less formal means, and it is difficult to move from the path of vocational education to technical education or academia. Furthermore, there is limited support for occupational and career development in the public and private sectors. The draft TVET strategy intends to improve the interconnection between various training and education programs and address the poor public perception of current programs through the following actions:

(1) Improve dialogue between TVET institutions and industry/employers.

(2) Respond to market needs in coordination with industry and employers.

(3) Organize road shows for TVET providers to demonstrate their capacity, and for employers to demonstrate skills upgrade possibilities.

(4) Involve industry and employers in curriculum development and mentorship, and as board members of TVET institutions.

(5) Provide financial and administrative incentives to private sector entities interested in investing in TVET institutions.

(6) Set levels and an incentive system for TVET graduates comparable with academic graduates.

Implications of the Findings

The Latent rating for central Iraq on the System Oversight dimension suggests that there are many improvements that could be made. Looking at the features of established and advanced WfD systems in other countries, Iraq could consider the introduction of a funding mechanism for TVET that is based on enrollment, graduate employment, and earnings. The establishment of a NQF for Iraq, with competency standards, skills testing and certification, and systems for accreditation, could help to facilitate the interconnection and articulation of different education and training programs for WfD. Other suggestions for the way forward in relation to the System Oversight dimension include:

(1) Incentivize skills upgrading in the private sector and strengthen partnerships between training providers and employers to ensure experience exchange and stable funding.

(2) Develop competency based curricula for training courses.

6. Managing Service Delivery for Results on the Ground

Training providers, both non-state and government, are the main channels through which a country's WfD policies are translated into results on the ground. This chapter therefore provides a brief overview of the composition of providers and the types of services available in the system before presenting the detailed SABER-WfD findings on Service Delivery and their implications for central Iraq.

Overview of the Delivery of Training Services

Primary education in Iraq is mandatory by law. Secondary education in central Iraq is divided into two cycles, each of three-year duration. The intermediate cycle follows common curricula and culminates with a Certificate of Intermediate Studies when students are approximately 14 years old. It is followed by the preparatory cycle which requires students to choose a track and a specialization. Within the vocational track, students have the option of selecting among four specialties: agriculture, industry, applied arts and commerce. In 2008/09, approximately 60,000 students received training in 289 public vocational schools across central Iraq. Enrollment was particularly concentrated in the industrial and commerce specialties, and was dominated by male trainees from urban areas.[27]

Many secondary and vocational education graduates have the chance to pursue technical education and/or training in public institutions. Non-state providers have a limited role in postsecondary TVET. By 2011, FTE was running 27 technical institutes that offered 2-year programs, and 16 technical colleges that offered 4-year programs and higher education courses. Approximately 100 thousand students were then enrolled in FTE's programs in the fields of engineering, health, agriculture, management, informatics and arts. [28]

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[27] Data provided by the MOE General Directorate of Vocational Education.
[28] Data provided by the MOHESR.

Approximately 75 percent of these trainees were enrolled in two year programs.

SABER WfD Ratings on Service Delivery

The Policy Goals for this Dimension in the SABER-WfD framework focus on the following three aspects of service delivery: (a) enabling diversity and excellence in training provision; (b) fostering relevance in public training programs; and (c) enhancing evidence-based accountability for results. The ratings for these three Policy Goals are presented below and are followed by a reflection on their implications for policy dialogue.

Based on data collected by the SABER-WfD questionnaire, central Iraq receives an overall rating of 1.4 (Latent) for the Service Delivery Dimension (figure 7). This score is the average of the ratings for the underlying Policy Goals: (a) enabling diversity and excellence in training provision (1.6); (b) fostering relevance in public training programs (1.5); and (c) enhancing evidence-based accountability for results (1.0).

Scores are explained by the limited set of targets expected to be achieved by training providers. Repetition, graduation and job placement rates, as well as employer and trainee satisfaction are not among these targets. There are very few incentives for public or private institutions to improve their performance. Public institutions have limited autonomy as they cannot select trainees, introduce and close programs, or hire and dismiss staff. Training providers have poor

Figure 7: SABER-WfD Ratings for Central Iraq on the Service Delivery Dimension

Note: Figure 2 provides an explanation of the scale on the horizontal axis.
Source: Based on analysis of the data collected using the SABER-WfD questionnaire.

linkages with employers, industry and research institutes. Systems of data collection and monitoring for state and non-state providers are fragmented.

Policy Goal 7: Enabling Diversity and Excellence in Training Provision

The demand for skills is impossible to predict with precision, so having a diversity of providers is a feature of strong WfD systems around the world. Among non-state providers, the challenge is to temper the profit motive or other program agendas with appropriate regulation to ensure quality and relevance. Among state providers, a key concern is their responsiveness to the demand for skills from employers and students. Striking the right balance between institutional autonomy and accountability is one approach to address this concern. Policy Goal 7 takes these ideas into account and benchmarks the system according to the extent to which policies and institutional arrangements are in place to: (a) encourage and regulate non-state provision of training, and (b) foster excellence in public training provision by combining incentives and autonomy in the management of public institutions.

Iraq is rated at the **Latent** level for Policy Goal 7. This score reflects the limited contribution of non-state providers in the training market. There are many obstacles and constraints hindering the involvement of the private sector in training provision. These include a high level of bureaucracy, low demand, and a poorly performing private sector. There are no measures in place to ensure the quality of services of the 52 registered private training institutes and no performance targets have been set.

The government does not provide incentives (financial or non-financial) for state and non-state education and training providers to improve their quality. The public education and training institutes have limited autonomy and their capacity to introduce or close programs depends on the availability of funds, number of students enrolled, and approval of higher authorities—decisions are made without fundamental market studies or analytic findings. Before 2003, various TVET institutes had the capacity to generate funds through activities including the production of relevant goods.

Their capacity to do so has been diluted to a very limited range of activities after 2003.

Policy Goal 8: Fostering Relevance in Public Training Programs

Public training institutions need reliable information on current and emerging skills demands in order to keep their program offerings relevant to market conditions. It is therefore desirable for public training institutions to establish and maintain relationships with employers, industry associations, and research institutions. Such partners are a source of both information about skills competencies, expertise and advice on curriculum design, and technical specifications for training facilities and equipment. They can also help create opportunities for workplace training for students and continuing professional development for instructors and administrators. Policy Goal 8 considers the extent to which arrangements are in place for public training providers to: (a) benefit from industry and expert input in the design of programs, and (b) recruit administrators and instructors with relevant qualifications and support their professional development.

Iraq is evaluated at the **Latent** level of development for Policy Goal 8. Very limited links exist between public training institutions and employers. The only notable example is the agreement between the MOE's Vocational Education Department and the Wool Public Corporation to train students in their factories. There is no involvement of industry in curriculum design or in the specification of standards for training facilities. Links between public training providers and research institutions are rare. The Vocational Education Department may request the support of the Technology University in Baghdad for curriculum development, but this rarely takes place.

The available standards for recruitment of heads and instructors of education and training institutions do not include previous industry experience, and there is no system in place to advance their technical and managerial capacity.

Policy Goal 9: Enhancing Evidence-based Accountability for Results

Systematic monitoring and evaluation of service delivery are important for quality assurance and system improvement. Accomplishing these functions requires gathering and analyzing data from a variety of sources. The reporting of institution-level data enables the relevant authorities to ensure that providers are delivering on expected outcomes. Such data also enable these authorities to identify gaps or challenges in training provision or in areas of good practice. Additionally, periodic surveys and evaluations of major programs generate complementary information that can help enhance the relevance and efficiency of the system as a whole. Policy Goal 9 considers these ideas when assessing the system's arrangements for collecting and using data to focus attention on training outcomes, efficiency and innovation in service delivery.

Iraq scores at a very **Latent** level for Policy Goal 9. All training providers in central Iraq—state and non-state—lack cohesive and integrated data systems. Providers are not required to systematically report basic administrative data that could be used to monitor, assess and improve institutional performance or analyze system-level trends and issues.

Implications of the Findings

The latent level of development on the Service Delivery dimension for central Iraq suggests the need to consider avenues for improvement on several fronts. Based on the experience of established and advanced WfD systems around the world, these could include:

(1) Increase the autonomy of TVET institutions.

(2) Define the recruitment criteria for managers and instructors of TVET institutions and provide them with professional development opportunities on a regular basis.

(3) Strengthen the partnership between the public and private sectors at all levels.

(4) Establish a comprehensive TVET information system.

(5) Develop a monitoring and evaluation system for TVET providers.

Annex 1: List of Acronyms

CSO	Central Statistical Organization
DCI	Data collection instrument
FTE	Foundation of Technical Education
GDP	Gross domestic product
GDVE	General Directorate of Vocational Education
IBU	Iraqi Businessmen Union
IFI	Iraqi Federation of Industries
IKN	Iraq Knowledge Network
ILO	International Labour Organization
MOE	Ministry of Education
MOF	Ministry of Finance
MOHESR	Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research
MOL	Ministry of Labor
MOP	Ministry of Planning
NQF	National qualifications framework
SABER	Systems Approach to Better Education Results
TVET	Technical and vocational education and training
WfD	Workforce development

Annex 2: Structure of the SABER-WfD Framework

		Policy Goal	Policy Action		Topic in DCI 2.5 FINAL
Dimension 1 Strategic Framework		G1 Setting a Strategic Direction	Provide sustained advocacy for WfD at the top leadership level	G1_T1	Advocacy for WfD to Support Economic Development
				G1_T2	Strategic Focus and Decisions by the WfD Champions
		G2 Fostering a Demand-Led Approach	Establish clarity on the demand for skills and areas of critical constraint	G2_T1	Overall Assessment of Economic Prospects and Skills Implications
				G2_T2	Critical Skills Constraints in Priority Economic Sectors
			Engage employers in setting WfD priorities and in enhancing skills-upgrading for workers	G2_T3	Role of Employers and Industry
				G2_T4	Skills-Upgrading Incentives for Employers
				G2_T5	Monitoring of the Incentive Programs
		G3 Strengthening Critical Coordination	Formalize key WfD roles for coordinated action on strategic priorities	G3_T1	Roles of Government Ministries and Agencies
				G3_T2	Roles of Non-Government WfD Stakeholders
				G3_T3	Coordination for the Implementation of Strategic WfD Measures
Dimension 2 System Oversight		G4 Ensuring Efficiency and Equity in Funding	Provide stable funding for effective programs in initial, continuing and targeted vocational education and training	G4_T1	Overview of Funding for WfD
				G4_T2	Recurrent Funding for Initial Vocational Education and Training (IVET)
				G4_T3	Recurrent Funding for Continuing Vocational Education and Training Programs (CVET)
				G4_T4	Recurrent Funding for Training-related Active Labor Market Programs (ALMPs)
			Monitor and enhance equity in funding for training	G4_T5	Equity in Funding for Training Programs
			Facilitate sustained partnerships between training institutions and employers	G4_T6	Partnerships between Training Providers and Employers
		G5 Assuring Relevant and Reliable Standards	Broaden the scope of competency standards as a basis for developing qualifications frameworks	G5_T1	Competency Standards and National Qualifications Frameworks
				G5_T2	Competency Standards for Major Occupations
			Establish protocols for assuring the credibility of skills testing and certification	G5_T3	Occupational Skills Testing
				G5_T4	Skills Testing and Certification
				G5_T5	Skills Testing for Major Occupations
			Develop and enforce accreditation standards for maintaining the quality of training provision	G5_T6	Government Oversight of Accreditation
				G5_T7	Establishment of Accreditation Standards
				G5_T8	Accreditation Requirements and Enforcement of Accreditation Standards
				G5_T9	Incentives and Support for Accreditation
		G6 Diversifying Pathways for Skills Acquisition	Promote educational progression and permeability through multiple pathways, including for TVET students	G6_T1	Learning Pathways
				G6_T2	Public Perception of Pathways for TVET
			Facilitate life-long learning through articulation of skills certification and recognition of prior learning	G6_T3	Articulation of Skills Certification
				G6_T4	Recognition of Prior Learning
			Provide support services for skills acquisition by workers, job-seekers and the disadvantaged	G6_T5	Support for Further Occupational and Career Development
				G6_T6	Training-related Provision of Services for the Disadvantaged
Dimension 3 Service Delivery		G7 Enabling Diversity and Excellence in Training Provision	Encourage and regulate non-state provision of training	G7_T1	Scope and Formality of Non-State Training Provision
				G7_T2	Incentives for Non-State Providers
				G7_T3	Quality Assurance of Non-State Training Provision
				G7_T4	Review of Policies towards Non-State Training Provision
			Combine incentives and autonomy in the management of public training institutions	G7_T5	Targets and Incentives for Public Training Institutions
				G7_T6	Autonomy and Accountability of Public Training Institutions
				G7_T7	Introduction and Closure of Public Training Programs
		G8 Fostering Relevance in Public Training Programs	Integrate industry and expert input into the design and delivery of public training programs	G8_T1	Links between Training Institutions and Industry
				G8_T2	Industry Role in the Design of Program Curricula
				G8_T3	Industry Role in the Specification of Facility Standards
				G8_T4	Links between Training and Research Institutions
			Recruit and support administrators and instructors for enhancing the market-relevance of public training programs	G8_T5	Recruitment and In-Service Training of Heads of Public Training Institutions
				G8_T6	Recruitment and In-Service Training of Instructors of Public Training Institutions
		G9 Enhancing Evidence-based Accountability for Results	Expand the availability and use of policy-relevant data for focusing providers' attention on training outcomes, efficiency and innovation	G9_T1	Administrative Data from Training Providers
				G9_T2	Survey and Other Data
				G9_T3	Use of Data to Monitor and Improve Program and System Performance

Annex 3: Rubrics for Scoring the Data

Functional Dimension 1: Strategic Framework				
Policy Goal	**Level of Development**			
	Latent	**Emerging**	**Established**	**Advanced**
G1: Setting a Strategic Direction for WfD	Visible champions for WfD are either **absent** or take **no specific action** to advance strategic WfD priorities.	**Some** visible champions provide *ad-hoc* advocacy for WfD and have acted on **few** interventions to advance strategic WfD priorities; **no arrangements** exist to monitor and review implementation progress.	**Government leaders** exercise **sustained** advocacy for WfD with **occasional,** *ad-hoc* participation from **non-government leaders;** their advocacy focuses on **selected** industries or economic sectors and manifests itself through **a range** of specific interventions**;** implementation progress is monitored, albeit through *ad-hoc* reviews**.**	**Both government and non-government leaders** exercise **sustained** advocacy for WfD, and rely on **routine, institutionalized** processes to collaborate on **well-integrated** interventions to advance a **strategic, economy-wide** WfD policy agenda; implementation progress is monitored and reviewed through **routine, institutionalized** processes**.**

Functional Dimension 1: Strategic Framework			
Policy Goal	**Level of Development**		
	Latent	**Emerging**	**Established**	**Advanced**

G2: Fostering a Demand-Led Approach to WfD	There is **no assessment** of the country's economic prospects and their implications for skills; industry and employers have a **limited or no role** in defining strategic WfD priorities and receive **limited** support from the government for skills upgrading.	**Some *ad-hoc*** assessments exist on the country's economic prospects and their implications for skills; **some** measures are taken to address critical skills constraints (e.g., incentives for skills upgrading by employers); the government makes **limited** efforts to engage employers as strategic partners in WfD.	**Routine** assessments based on **multiple data sources** exist on the country's economic prospects and their implications for skills; a **wide range** of measures with **broad** coverage are taken to address critical skills constraints; the government recognizes employers as strategic partners in WfD, **formalizes** their role, and **provides support** for skills upgrading through incentive schemes that are **reviewed and adjusted**.	A rich array of **routine and robust** assessments by **multiple stakeholders** exists on the country's economic prospects and their implications for skills; the information provides a basis for a **wide range** of measures with **broad** coverage that address critical skills constraints; the government recognizes employers as strategic partners in WfD, **formalizes** their role, and **provides support** for skills upgrading through incentives, including some form of a **levy-grant scheme**, that are **systematically reviewed** for impact and **adjusted** accordingly.

Functional Dimension 1: Strategic Framework			
Policy Goal	**Level of Development**		
	Latent	**Emerging**	**Established**	**Advanced**

	Latent	Emerging	Established	Advanced
G3: Strengthening Critical Coordination for Implementation	Industry/employers have a **limited or no role** in defining strategic WfD priorities; the government either provides **no incentives** to encourage skills upgrading by employers or conducts **no reviews** of such incentive programs.	Industry/employers help define WfD priorities on an ***ad-hoc*** basis and make **limited** contributions to address skills implications of major policy/investment decisions; the government provides **some** incentives for skills upgrading for formal and informal sector employers; if a levy-grant scheme exists its coverage is **limited**; incentive programs are **not systematically** reviewed for impact.	Industry/employers help define WfD priorities on a **routine** basis and make **some** contributions in **selected** areas to address the skills implications of major policy/investment decisions; the government provides **a range** of incentives for skills upgrading for all employers; a levy-grant scheme with **broad** coverage of formal sector employers exists; incentive programs are **systematically** reviewed and **adjusted;** an annual report on the levy-grant scheme is published with **a time lag**.	Industry/employers help define WfD priorities on a **routine** basis and make **significant** contributions in **multiple** areas to address the skills implications of major policy/investment decisions; the government provides **a range** of incentives for skills upgrading for all employers; a levy-grant scheme with **comprehensive** coverage of formal sector employers exists; incentive programs to encourage skills upgrading are **systematically** reviewed for **impact on skills and productivity** and are **adjusted** accordingly; an annual report on the levy-grant scheme is published in **a timely fashion**.

Functional Dimension 2: System Oversight			
Policy Goal	**Level of Development**		
	Latent	**Emerging**	**Established**	**Advanced**

Policy Goal	Latent	Emerging	Established	Advanced
G4: Ensuring Efficiency and Equity in Funding	The government funds IVET, CVET and ALMPs (but not OJT in SMEs) based on *ad-hoc* budgeting processes, but takes **no action** to facilitate formal partnerships between training providers and employers; the impact of funding on the beneficiaries of training programs has **not been recently reviewed**.	The government funds IVET, CVET (including OJT in SMEs) and ALMPs; funding for IVET and CVET follows **routine** budgeting processes involving **only government officials** with allocations determined largely by the **previous year's budget**; funding for ALMPs is decided by government officials on an *ad-hoc* basis and targets **select** population groups through various channels; the government takes **some** action to facilitate **formal** partnerships between individual training providers and employers; recent reviews considered the impact of funding on **only training-related indicators** (e.g. enrollment, completion), which stimulated dialogue among **some** WfD stakeholders.	The government funds IVET, CVET (including OJT in SMEs) and ALMPs; funding for IVET is **routine** and based on **multiple** criteria, including evidence of program effectiveness; recurrent funding for CVET relies on **formal** processes with **input** from key stakeholders and annual reporting **with a lag**; funding for ALMPs is determined through a **systematic** process with **input** from key stakeholders**;** ALMPs target **diverse** population groups through various channels and are reviewed for impact but follow-up is **limited**; the government takes action to facilitate **formal** partnerships between training providers and employers at **multiple** levels (institutional and systemic); recent reviews considered the impact of funding **on both** training-related indicators and labor market outcomes; the reviews stimulated dialogue among WfD stakeholders and **some** recommendations were implemented.	The government funds IVET, CVET (including OJT in SMEs) and ALMPs; funding for IVET is **routine** and based on **comprehensive** criteria, including evidence of program effectiveness, that are **routinely reviewed and adjusted**; recurrent funding for CVET relies on **formal** processes with **input** from key stakeholders and **timely annual reporting**; funding for ALMPs is determined through a **systematic** process with **input** from key stakeholders; ALMPs target **diverse** population groups through various channels and are reviewed for impact and **adjusted** accordingly; the government takes action to facilitate **formal** partnerships between training providers and employers at **all levels** (institutional and systemic); recent reviews considered the impact of funding on a **full range** of training-related indicators and labor market outcomes; the reviews stimulated **broad-based** dialogue among WfD stakeholders and **key** recommendations were implemented.

Functional Dimension 2: System Oversight				
Policy Goal	**Level of Development**			
	Latent	**Emerging**	**Established**	**Advanced**
G5: Assuring Relevant and Reliable Standards	Policy dialogue on competency standards and/or the NQF occurs on an *ad-hoc* basis with **limited** engagement of key stakeholders; competency standards have **not been defined**; skills testing for major occupations is **mainly theory-based** and certificates awarded are recognized by **public sector employers only** and have **little** impact on employment and earnings; **no system** is in place to establish accreditation standards.	**A few** stakeholders engage in *ad-hoc* policy dialogue on competency standards and/or the NQF; competency standards exist for a **few** occupations and are used by **some** training providers in their programs; skills testing is competency-based for a **few** occupations but for the most part is **mainly theory-based**; certificates are recognized by **public and some private sector employers** but have **little impact** on employment and earnings; the accreditation of training providers is supervised by a **dedicated office** in the relevant ministry; private providers are required to be accredited, however accreditation standards are **not consistently publicized or enforced**; providers are offered **some** incentives to seek and retain accreditation.	**Numerous** stakeholders engage in policy dialogue on competency standards and/or the NQF through **institutionalized** processes; competency standards exist for **most** occupations and are used by **some** training providers in their programs; the NQF, if in place, covers **some** occupations and **a range** of skill levels; skills testing for **most** occupations follows standard procedures, is competency-based and assesses **both theoretical knowledge and practical skills**; certificates are recognized by **both public and private sector employers** and **may impact** employment and earnings; the accreditation of training providers is supervised by a **dedicated agency** in the relevant ministry; the agency is responsible for defining accreditation standards with **stakeholder input**; standards are reviewed on an *ad-hoc* basis and are publicized or enforced to **some** extent; all providers receiving public funding must be accredited; providers are offered **incentives** and **limited support** to seek and retain accreditation.	**All key** stakeholders engage in policy dialogue on competency standards and/or the NQF through **institutionalized** processes; competency standards exist for **most** occupations and are used by training providers in their programs; the NQF, if in place, covers **most** occupations and a **wide range** of skill levels; skills testing for **most** occupations follows standard procedures, is competency-based and assesses **both theoretical knowledge and practical skills**; **robust protocols**, including **random audits**, ensure the credibility of certification; certificates are **valued by most employers** and **consistently improve** employment prospects and earnings; the accreditation of training providers is supervised by a **dedicated agency** in the relevant ministry; the agency is responsible for defining accreditation standards **in consultation with stakeholders**; standards are reviewed following **established protocols** and are publicized and **routinely** enforced; all training providers are required as well as offered **incentives and support** to seek and retain accreditation.

Functional Dimension 2: System Oversight				
Policy Goal	**Level of Development**			
	Latent	**Emerging**	**Established**	**Advanced**
G6: Diversifying Pathways for Skills Acquisition	Students in technical and vocational education have **few or no options** for further formal skills acquisition beyond the secondary level and the government takes **no action** to improve public perception of TVET; certificates for technical and vocational programs are **not recognized** in the NQF; qualifications certified by non-Education ministries are **not recognized** by formal programs under the Ministry of Education; recognition of prior learning receives **limited** attention; the government provides **practically no support** for further occupational and career development, or training programs for disadvantaged populations.	Students in technical and vocational education can only progress to **vocationally-oriented, non-university programs**; the government takes **limited** action to improve public perception of TVET (e.g. diversifying learning pathways); **some** certificates for technical and vocational programs are recognized in the NQF; **few** qualifications certified by non-Education ministries are recognized by formal programs under the Ministry of Education; policymakers pay **some** attention to the recognition of prior learning and provide the public with **some** information on the subject; the government offers **limited** services for further occupational and career development through **stand-alone local service centers** that are **not integrated** into a system; training programs for disadvantaged populations receive *ad-hoc* support.	Students in technical and vocational education can progress to **vocationally-oriented programs, including at the university level**; the government takes **some** action to improve public perception of TVET (e.g. diversifying learning pathways and improving program quality) and reviews the impact of such efforts on an *ad-hoc* basis; **most** certificates for technical and vocational programs are recognized in the NQF; a **large number** of qualifications certified by non-Education ministries are recognized by formal programs under the Ministry of Education, albeit **without the granting of credits**; policymakers give **some** attention to the recognition of prior learning and provide the public with **some** information on the subject; a **formal association** of stakeholders provides **dedicated** attention to adult learning issues; the government offers **limited** services for further occupational and career development, which are available through an **integrated network of centers**; training programs for disadvantaged populations receive **systematic** support and are reviewed for impact on an *ad-hoc* basis.	Students in technical and vocational education can progress to **academically or vocationally-oriented programs, including at the university level**; the government takes **coherent** action on **multiple fronts** to improve public perception of TVET (e.g. diversifying learning pathways and improving program quality and relevance, with the support of a media campaign) and **routinely** reviews and **adjusts** such efforts to maximize their impact; **most** certificates for technical and vocational programs are recognized in the NQF; a **large number** of qualifications certified by non-Education ministries are recognized and **granted credits** by formal programs under the Ministry of Education; policymakers give **sustained** attention to the recognition of prior learning and provide the public with **comprehensive** information on the subject; a **national organization** of stakeholders provides **dedicated** attention to adult learning issues; the government offers a **comprehensive menu** of services for further occupational and career development, **including online resources**, which are available through an **integrated network of centers**; training programs for disadvantaged populations receive **systematic** support with **multi-year budgets** and are **routinely** reviewed for impact and **adjusted** accordingly.

Functional Dimension 3: Service Delivery			
Policy Goal	**Level of Development**		
	Latent	**Emerging**	**Established**	**Advanced**

Policy Goal	Latent	Emerging	Established	Advanced
G7: Enabling Diversity and Excellence in Training Provision	There is **no diversity** of training provision as the system is largely comprised of **public providers** with **limited or no autonomy**; training provision is **not informed** by formal assessment, stakeholder input or performance targets.	There is **some** diversity in training provision; non-state providers operate with **limited** government incentives and **governance** over registration, licensing and quality assurance; public training is provided by institutions with **some** autonomy and informed by **some** assessment of implementation constraints, stakeholder input and basic targets.	There is **diversity** in training provision; non-state training providers, **some** registered and licensed, operate within **a range** of government incentives, **systematic** quality assurance measures and **routine** reviews of government policies toward non-state training providers; public providers, mostly governed by management boards, have **some** autonomy; training provision is informed by **formal analysis** of implementation constraints, stakeholder input and basic targets; lagging providers receive **support** and exemplary institutions are **rewarded**.	There is **broad** diversity in training provision; non-state training providers, **most** registered and licensed, operate with **comprehensive** government incentives, **systematic** quality assurance measures and **routine** review and **adjustment** of government policies toward non-state training providers; public providers, mostly governed by management boards, have **significant** autonomy; decisions about training provision are **time-bound** and informed by **formal assessment** of implementation constraints; stakeholder input and use of a **variety of measures** to incentivize performance include support, rewards and performance-based funding.

Functional Dimension 3: Service Delivery				
Policy Goal	**Level of Development**			
	Latent	**Emerging**	**Established**	**Advanced**
G8: Fostering Relevance in Public Training Programs	There are **few or no attempts** to foster relevance in public training programs through encouraging links between training institutions, industry and research institutions or through setting standards for the recruitment and training of heads and instructors in training institutions.	Relevance of public training is enhanced through **informal** links between **some** training institutions, industry and research institutions, including **input** into the design of curricula and facility standards; heads and instructors are recruited on the basis of **minimum academic standards** and have **limited** opportunities for professional development.	Relevance of public training is enhanced through **formal** links between **some** training institutions, industry and research institutions, leading to collaboration in **several** areas including but not limited to the design of curricula and facility standards; heads and instructors are recruited on the basis of **minimum academic and professional standards** and have **regular** access to opportunities for professional development.	Relevance of public training is enhanced through **formal** links between **most** training institutions, industry and research institutions, leading to **significant** collaboration in a **wide range** of areas; heads and instructors are recruited on the basis of **minimum academic and professional standards** and have **regular** access to **diverse** opportunities for professional development, including **industry attachments** for instructors.

Functional Dimension 3: Service Delivery			
Policy Goal	**Level of Development**			
	Latent	**Emerging**	**Established**	**Advanced**
G9: Enhancing Evidence-based Accountability for Results	There are **no specific** data collection and reporting requirements, but training providers maintain their **own databases;** the government **does not conduct or sponsor** skills-related surveys or impact evaluations and **rarely** uses data to monitor and improve system performance.	Training providers collect and report **administrative** data and there are **significant** gaps in reporting by non-state providers; **some** public providers issue annual reports and the government **occasionally** sponsors or conducts skills-related surveys; the government **does not consolidate data** in a system-wide database and uses **mostly administrative data** to monitor and improve system performance; the government publishes information on graduate labor market outcomes for **some** training programs.	Training providers collect and report **administrative and other** data (e.g., job placement statistics, earnings of graduates) and there are **some** gaps in reporting by non-state providers; **most** public providers issue internal annual reports and the government **routinely** sponsors skills-related surveys; the government consolidates data in a **system-wide database** and uses **administrative data** and information from **surveys** to monitor and improve system performance; the government publishes information on graduate labor market outcomes for **numerous** training programs.	Training providers collect and report **administrative and other** data (e.g., job placement statistics, earnings of graduates) and there are **few** gaps in reporting by non-state providers; **most** public providers issue **publicly available** annual reports and the government **routinely** sponsors or conducts skills-related surveys and impact evaluations; the government consolidates data in a **system-wide, up to date database** and uses **administrative data**, information from **surveys and impact evaluations** to monitor and improve system performance; the government publishes information on graduate labor market outcomes for **most** training programs **online**.

Annex 4: References and Informants

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Annex 5: Table of SABER-WfD Scores

		Policy Goal		Policy Action		Topic	
Dimension 1	1.1	G1	1.0	Provide sustained advocacy for WfD at the top leadership level	1.0	G1_T1	1
						G1_T2	1
		G2	1.0	Establish clarity on the demand for skills and areas of critical constraint	1.0	G2_T1	1
						G2_T2	1
				Engage employers in setting WfD priorities and in enhancing skills-upgrading for workers	1.0	G2_T3	1
						G2_T4	1
						G2_T5	1
		G3	1.3	Formalize key WfD roles for coordinated action on strategic priorities	1.3	G3_T1	2
						G3_T2	1
						G3_T3	1
Dimension 2	1.3	G4	1.3	Provide stable funding for effective programs in initial, continuing and targeted vocational education and training	1.6	G4_T1	info
						G4_T2	2
						G4_T3	1
						G4_T4	2
				Monitor and enhance equity in funding for training	1.0	G4_T5_IVET	1
						G4_T5_CVET	1
						G4_T5_ALMP	1
				Facilitate sustained partnerships between training institutions and employers	1.0	G4_T6	1
		G5	1.3	Broaden the scope of competency standards as a basis for developing qualifications frameworks	1.5	G5_T1	2
						G5_T2	1
				Establish protocols for assuring the credibility of skills testing and certification	1.3	G5_T3	1
						G5_T4	1
						G5_T5	2
				Develop and enforce accreditation standards for maintaining the quality of training provision	1.0	G5_T6	info
						G5_T7	1
						G5_T8	1
						G5_T9	1
		G6	1.3	Promote educational progression and permeability through multiple pathways, including for TVET students	2.0	G6_T1	2
						G6_T2	2
				Strengthen the system for skills certification and recognition	1.0	G6_T3	1
						G6_T4	1
				Enhance support for skills acquisition by workers, job-seekers and the disadvantaged	1.0	G6_T5	1
						G6_T6	1
Dimension 3	1.4	G7	1.6	Encourage and regulate non-state provision of training	1.8	G7_T1	3
						G7_T2	2
						G7_T3	1
						G7_T4	1
				Combine incentives and autonomy in the management of public training institutions	1.5	G7_T5	1.5
						G7_T6	1
						G7_T7	2
		G8	1.5	Integrate industry and expert input into the design and delivery of public training programs	1.3	G8_T1	1.5
						G8_T2	1
						G8_T3	1
						G8_T4	1.5
				Recruit and support administrators and instructors for enhancing the market-relevance of public training programs	2.0	G8_T5	2
						G8_T6	2
		G9	1.0	Expand the availability and use of policy-relevant data for focusing providers' attention on training outcomes, efficiency and innovation	1.0	G9_T1	1
						G9_T2	1
						G9_T3	1

Annex 6: Authorship and Acknowledgements

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The **Systems Approach for Better Education Results (SABER)** initiative produces comparative data and knowledge on education policies and institutions, with the aim of helping countries systematically strengthen their education systems. SABER evaluates the quality of education policies against evidence-based global standards, using new diagnostic tools and detailed policy data. The SABER country reports give all parties with a stake in educational results—from administrators, teachers, and parents to policymakers and business people—an accessible, objective snapshot showing how well the policies of their country's education system are oriented toward ensuring that all children and youth learn.

This report focuses specifically on policies in the area of workforce development.

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